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Research provides important evidences about the role of emotions in a wide range of judgments,
includingmoral decisions (Haidt, 2003; Teper et al., 2015). Recent findings show that real compared
to hypothetical moral decisions brings about higher physiological activity (Teper et al., 2011). In
agreement, studies on the autonomic correlates of deception reported: (i) higher skin conductance
(Coricelli et al., 2010); (ii) increased pupil dilation (Hochman et al., 2016); (iii) higher regulation of
sympathetic activity before lying for a self-gain when reputation is at risk (Panasiti et al., 2016).
However, there is little evidence regarding the influence of discrete emotions on dishonesty.
Notably, exceptions are the few studies reporting that inducing envy (Moran and Schweitzer, 2005;
Gino and Pierce, 2009) or anxiety (Kouchaki and Desai, 2015) enhances deception, while inducing
anger or fear oppositely influences hypothetical ethical decisions (Kligyte et al., 2013).
In their recent paper, Motro et al. (2016) made considerable advances in the literature, by
reporting that induction of anger and guilt enhances and decreases deception, respectively.
Crucially, they also report that the influence of these emotions on deception is mediated by the
increment of impulsive thinking in the case of anger and by the enhancement of deliberate thinking
in the case of guilt. In this commentary, we propose an additional explanation of their findings that
aims at connecting the authors’ results with those of other important studies about deception.
On the one hand, Motro’s results nicely fit with studies showing that guilt induction reduces
cheating when experiencing physical weights (Kouchaki et al., 2014) and that anger promotes
deception by reducing empathy and enhancing self-interest (Yip and Schweitzer, 2016). Also
developmental research shows that in 4- and 8-years old children, anger enhances immoral
(aggressive) behavior, and that this increment is mitigated by children’s ability to anticipate guilt
(Colasante et al., 2016).
Moreover, the mediation of deliberate vs impulsive thinking supports the Theory of “Deliberate
Honesty” according to which, when deception is tempting, dishonesty is the immediate choice
while honesty would require reflection (Bereby-Meyer and Shalvi, 2015).
On the other hand, recent theories posit that any choice could be impulsive or deliberate
depending on the value-based computation between alternatives (Berkman et al., 2016).
Accordingly, the Self-Concept Maintenance Hypothesis (Mazar et al., 2008) proposes that deciding
whether to deceive involves a conflict between the temptation to dishonestly achieve some benefit
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(extrinsic goal) and the desire to act according to internalized
social norms (intrinsic goal). This conflict is modulated by
several variables: dishonesty is enhanced by anonymity (Zhong
et al., 2010), time-pressure (Shalvi et al., 2012), monetary
priming (Gino and Mogilner, 2014), sense of entitlement (Poon
et al., 2013; Schurr and Ritov, 2016), and positive self-concept
activation (Khan and Dhar, 2006; Brown et al., 2011); conversely,
honesty is enhanced by reading statements that endorse free-
will (Vohs and Schooler, 2008), the Ten Commandments (Mazar
et al., 2008), a code of honor (Shu et al., 2011), or by the need to
safeguard one’s own reputation (Panasiti et al., 2011, 2014, 2016).
Here, we propose that anger and guilt might have enhanced
the salience of extrinsic (money) vs. intrinsic (honesty) goals,
respectively. Anger is triggered when the achievement of one’s
important extrinsic goal is prevented by somebody or something
(Lazarus and Lazarus, 1994; Turner, 2007), or when someone else
behaves unfairly (i.e., in a way that prevents others to reach their
extrinsic goal; Pillutla and Murnighan, 1996). Differently, guilt
is evoked by the awareness that we did not act morally (Sheikh
and Janoff-Bulman, 2010) and thus that we did not accomplish
an intrinsic goal. These links are supported by findings showing
that: (i) anger facilitates attention (He et al., 2013) and gaze-
imitation (Terburg et al., 2012) toward rewarding cues and it
is associated with reward-related electrocortical activity (Angus
et al., 2015); (ii) baseline activity of the insula and guilt aversion
promote the achievement of intrinsic social goals (Chang et al.,
2011; Baumgartner et al., 2013).
This alternative explanation aims at reconciling the seeming
inconsistency between Motro’s results and the studies that show
how deliberation and impulsivity are not necessary linked to
honesty and dishonesty, respectively. It has been showed for
example that inducing a deliberate vs. intuitive mindset increases
deception (Zhong, 2011) and that honesty is the default choice
for most people (Xu and Ma, 2015).
Moreover, Machiavellians and psychopaths who are
strategically dishonest and show low sense of guilt, constitute
perfect examples of why deliberation (i) is not always triggered
by guilt and (ii) is not necessarily associated to honesty. In
particular, Machiavellian people feel low sense of guilt for
lying (Gozna et al., 2001); have no need to down-regulate
their autonomic system before lying (Panasiti et al., 2016), and
show no cortical motor inhibition nor reputation effects for
lying (Panasiti et al., 2011, 2014). They are also highly strategic
(Jones and Paulhus, 2012) and this bring them to a great deal of
deception during their everyday life (Kashy and DePaulo, 1996).
Similarly, psychopaths are more likely to perform premeditated
(deliberate) than impulsive crimes (Swogger et al., 2010), and
show a weaker modulation of anticipated guilt in anterior insula
(Seara-Cardoso et al., 2016).
Here, we suggest that despite a change in goals’ salience might
in turn cause a change in the propensity of using deliberate
vs. impulsive thinking, style of thinking alone might not be
sufficient to modulate participants’ ethical behavior. Differently,
the crucial modulation might lie in the change of goals’ salience
itself. This interpretation would explain why (i) manipulative and
psychopathic people who are more attracted to extrinsic than
intrinsic goals (Mchoskey, 1999) engage in deliberate thinking
and yet behave dishonestly; (ii) inducing an impulsive setting
without priming extrinsic goals enhances honesty (Zhong, 2011);
(iii) honesty becomes the default choice as participants’ moral
identity increases (Xu and Ma, 2015).
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